A somewhat unique feature of the global climate negotiations is that most governments allow representatives of civil society organizations to be part of their national delegation. It remains unclear, however, why states grant this access in the first place. While there are likely to be benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, the paper argues for a 'contagion' effect in order to explain this phenomenon. States, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states' actions and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil society actors if their counterparts do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the participation of civil society organizations in national delegations to global climate negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the paper also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the recent UNFCCC negotiations in Durban in 2011.
Introduction
Civil society organizations (CSOs) 1 have become increasingly important in world politics over the past few decades. Academic interest in the drivers of this development has grown accordingly, with a strong focus on policy areas such as human rights and environmental politics where the involvement of CSOs is particularly pronounced (e.g., Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Charnovitz 1997; Raustiala 1997; Clark et al. 1998; Scholte 2004; Betsill 2006; Bernauer & Betzold 2012; Bernauer et al. 2013) . Much of this existing research on civil society in global governance concentrates on whether and how CSOs are able to influence international policy-making and its outcomes (e.g., Paterson 1996; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Betsill 2006) . However, one aspect of this issue has received rather little attention to date: why do governments frequently include CSOs formally in international policy-making?
This question is fundamental because most scholars agree that states were and generally still are in control of international policy-making processes. Why, to what extent, and in what form could they be interested in relinquishing some control over policy-making? On the one hand, the overwhelming majority of global governance sectors, e.g., trade liberalization, monetary policy, banking regulation, or security policy efforts, is strictly intergovernmental (Thomann 2007) . On the other hand, the participation of CSOs in international politics exists in a few areas, 2 and in particular the policy-making process in global climate policy is characterized by the presence of numerous civil society observers and an impressive number of CSO representatives that are formally included in states' negotiation delegations. For 1 Following Steffek & Nanz (2007: 28f; see also Castiglione 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998) , we consider as civil society all those actors (groups) that pursue interests in global governance, but do not belong to or are affiliated with official governmental and/or state entities. This approach possibly employs the broadest definition by also including business associations or corporations (see also Biermann & Gupta 2011 , 1856 Bernstein 2005: 148; Haas 1999: 103) . 2 For instance, one might think of the International Labor Office with its tripartite corporatist representation of government, business, and labor. As elaborated below, however, we focus on CSOs' membership in states' delegations at the global climate negotiations, which we define as formal participation.
example, during the 2011 round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, about the same number of civil society and government representatives participated; more than 70% of the 193 countries involved formally granted at least one CSO representative access to their national delegation; and about 18% of all members of national delegations were CSO representatives (see .
The formal inclusion of CSOs in national delegations generally offers greater opportunities for these actors to influence governmental decision-making (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 59; Steffek & Nanz 2007: 11; Thomann 2007) . 3 This stems from the fact that CSOs are then not excluded from the unofficial sessions between governments, which are usually the decisive places for drafting conference declarations or treaties (Clark et al. 1998: 18) . Hence, they actively participate in informal backdoor diplomacy, receive official state documents, and are able to present proposals (Raustiala 1997; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004) . Gulbrandsen & Andresen (2004: 73) conclude accordingly that CSOs are likely to 'have the most far-reaching influence on […] negotiations if they foster ways to work closely and collaboratively with key negotiators.'
While it thus seems apparent why CSOs would welcome their inclusion in national delegations, it is more difficult to understand why governments may want to grant CSOs access in the first place. 4 First and foremost, including CSOs is likely to constrain governmental autonomy or sovereignty, which we define as 'the institutionalization of public 3 We do not imply that participating in state delegations is the exclusive avenue for exerting influence. We do also not state that access to delegations always and necessarily induces access to higher levels of decision-making. We claim, however, that it is one potential (and perhaps a sufficient) avenue for doing so. In consistence with that, Biermann & Gupta (2011 emphasize that the inclusion of civil society actors in international negotiations constitutes an important facet of those negotiations, while Gulbrandsen (2008) is particularly interested in the 'privileged access' of non-governmental actors (see also Sell & Prakash 2004: 151) . 4 Note that existent approaches such as the boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink 1998) 'privilege the agency of NGOs and do not consider why states would sometimes institutionalize' the relationship to civil society actors (Vabulas 2011: 1) . That being said, considering also supply-side arguments would arguably provide a more comprehensive picture. However, this is beyond the scope of our paper and actually prevented due to data limitations. We will return to this issue in the conclusion.
authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains' (Ruggie 1986: 143) , in the sense that this cuts into the traditional prerogative of the nation-state to negotiate international agreements with other governments (Clark et al. 1998; Clark 1995; Stasavage 2004 ).
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Consequently, states determine which non-governmental actors may participate and CSOs are often denied access to policy-making processes or are only allowed to participate as observers, i.e., they are not permitted to express their positions and participate in decisionmaking during the negotiating process per se (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; Thomann 2007 ).
In light of this, it is rather puzzling why governments formally include CSOs, since sovereignty is normally seen as one of the most valuable goods for states (see Biermann & Gupta 2011 : 1856 . Nonetheless, the literature highlights two motivations of governments to involve CSOs (Grant & Keohane 2005; Biermann & Gupta 2011; ; for an overview, see, e.g., Bernauer & Betzold 2012) . First, states may expect to obtain useful information and expertise that they lack regarding the issue at hand (Raustiala 1997 ; see also Biermann & Pattberg 2008) . The second motivation focuses on legitimacy: governments may opt for civil society participation as a means to mitigate the 'democracy deficit' and/or to enhance the legitimacy of global governance (e.g., Bernstein
2005; Grant & Keohane 2005; Betsill & Corell 2008; Steffek & Ferretti 2009; Biermann & Gupta 2011; Keohane 2011; Dryzek 2012) .
In this paper, we focus on the legitimacy argument, which we combine with a social network perspective to explain variation in CSO inclusion in global climate governance. We argue that governments are a priori hesitant to formally include CSOs in international policymaking processes. However, governments are embedded in broader networks of interstate 5 Governments may try and avoid this dilemma by including CSOs that share the same interests with them. But doing so is unlikely to have the desired legitimacy increasing effect and, hence, the dilemma remains.
relations. States more strongly embedded in these networks benefit from a higher flow of The academic and practical relevance of our research extends beyond the specific case of climate policy, in the sense that this work contributes to 'identifying sources and mechanisms that can contribute to enhanced accountability and legitimacy of governance arrangements' (Biermann & Gupta 2011 : 1856 Kingsbury 2007; Mason 2008) .
Social networks, legitimacy, and civil society participation: Theoretical argument
We develop our theoretical argument by first elaborating on social networks and how they may affect the evolution of shared norms and practices through information flows. We then discuss the reasons for why states may want to grant CSOs access to global governance efforts more thoroughly, with an emphasis on the legitimacy enhancing effects of such an involvement. In a third step, we connect the social network and civil society arguments to hypothesize that governments, which are more central to the global governance network, are more likely to include civil society actors in response to other governments adopting this practice.
Social networks: The role of ties and centrality
In general, a social network is characterized by a set of actors and the relations between them (e.g., Borgatti et al. 2009; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Maoz 2010; Bodin & Prell 2011; Ward et al. 2011) . Actors can be individuals, groups of people, or states that are connected by specific types of relationships. Each kind of resource exchange is considered a network relation and actors experiencing such a relation are said to maintain a tie (or link). The strength of a tie may range from weak to strong, depending on the quantity, quality, or frequency of exchanges between actors. Patterns of who is tied to whom, and how, reveal the structure of the underlying network: they show how resources flow between actors and how these are interconnected in a network. Mutual memberships of two states in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), which will be of particular interest in this paper, provide one example for a tie linking two countries. These ties can be of direct or indirect nature. Direct links are connections that link two countries directly. States may also share indirect links, i.e., ties to one or more than one intermediary that connect two countries in the network. Direct and indirect links, therefore, connect a country to other states and determine the density, i.e., the cohesiveness of a social network as measured by the number and strength of links.
Ties in social networks, both direct and indirect, facilitate the transmission of information about interests and intentions, and they tend to promote a common understanding (Dorussen & Ward 2008: 192f) . Links that are shorter and denser enable actors to convey information at lower cost, with more precision, and faster. Denser social networks can thus help reduce uncertainty, increase trust, and facilitate the development of mutually accepted norms ( 
Legitimacy promoting effects of formal civil society involvement
As noted above, states should be generally unwilling to involve CSOs in global governance as this imposes constraints on government behavior (Clark 1995; Stasavage 2004 ). In the words of Clark et al. (1998: 29) state's negotiating position. Finally, the possibility exists that they leak confidential information to the press and the public.
The literature highlights two potential reasons why states might be interested in formally involving CSOs in global governance efforts nevertheless. First, governments may expect to obtain useful information and expertise (Raustiala 1997 ; see also Biermann & Pattberg 2008) . Raustiala (1997) , for example, notes that civil society can help governments to obtain policy-relevant information at low cost, given the high level of uncertainty and complexity that characterizes environmental issues. However, recent research does not find support for the empirical implications of the information argument. For example, observes that civil society actors are more often included in delegations of countries with a higher bureaucratic quality, which '[…] are least in need of expertise and information provision.' Others have challenged the knowledge argument on conceptual grounds: Bernauer & Betzold (2012: 64) argue that the 'existing research offers episodic, but not systematic and strong empirical evidence that more civil society participation has contributed to more effective agreements.'
Second, governments may want to formally include CSOs due to concerns over legitimacy.
Legitimacy commonly describes 'the state or quality of being legitimate, i.e., of being in accord with established legal norms and requirements, or conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards of behavior. Core elements of the concept of legitimacy are the acceptance and justification of authority. Acceptance relates to the way in which rules or institutions are accepted by a community as being authoritative. Justification relates to the reasons that justify the authority of certain rules or institutions' (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1858; see also Bernstein 2005; Keohane 2011). 6 In the words of Lipset (1983: 64) , 'legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.'
Hence, states may opt for civil society participation as a means to enhance legitimacy of global governance at the international but also the national level (Bernauer & Betzold 2012: 63; see also, e.g. , In fact, Hass (1999: 103) and Bernstein (2005: 148) 
Network centrality and civil society inclusion
The existing evidence seems to favor the legitimacy argument and we thus focus on this incentive of states in the following for combining it with the network perspective. In short, we argue for a contagion effect to the extent that states, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states' actions and policies toward civil society and may then react upon these.
driven by countries' interests to enhance legitimacy at the international but also the national level in order to increase the chances to 'sell' international agreements domestically. 8 Note, however, that civil society and its formal inclusion in states' negotiation delegations may not always or necessarily enhance legitimacy (e.g., Dryzek & Stevenson 2011 
Research design
We first use a quantitative approach to examine whether the empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical argument. This approach cannot, however, directly tell us whether legitimacy considerations and the tradeoff between sovereignty constraints and legitimacy gains are in fact the underlying driving force in governmental decisions on CSO involvement.
To enhance confidence in our quantitative findings, we thus add insights from survey research conducted at the 17 th Conference of the Parties (CoP) of the UNFCCC in Durban in 2011.
Dependent variable and methodology
With regard to the quantitative analyses, the dependent variable measures whether a country included at least one CSO representative in its national delegation to a given CoP to the UNFCCC (1) or not (0). These panel data cover the time period from 1995 to 2011 . Consistent with the UNFCCC definition applied to participants in CoPs, our treatment of CSO representatives includes persons who are not employed or affiliated with a government/state or an inter-governmental organization but pursue interests in global climate politics (see also Steffek & Nanz 2007) . We merged these data on CSO inclusion to a data set whose unit of analysis is the directed country-dyad-year, e.g., the data include both the country-pair France-Brazil in 1998 and the country-pair Brazil-France in 1998. This data structure is necessary given the inherent directed logic of our theory: Brazil's inclusion of CSOs could affect the probability of France also including CSOs -and vice versa. Because we lack data for most of our covariates after 2005, the combined data set covers the time period 1995-2005. The statistical analysis uses probit regression models, since the dependent variable is dichotomous. Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad to account for intra-group correlations or other forms of cross-section heterogeneity. The temporal dependencies are controlled by including a civil-society-years variable and different sets of cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998 ). This approach acknowledges that CSO inclusion might depend on corresponding choices in previous years.
Main explanatory variables
The main explanatory variables according to our argument are the behavior of other governments vis-à-vis CSOs and network centrality. With regard to the former, we use data on CSO inclusion by other countries as a proxy, taken from the same data source ) as used for the dependent variable -however, now focusing on a state's counterpart in a dyad. To avoid potential problems with endogeneity, this variable Civil society -Dyadic counterpart is lagged by one year.
For network centrality, we consider a country's whole range and any strength of all ties to the entire IGO network (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 563f; Dorussen & Ward 2008; Freeman et al. 1991) and calculate it in terms of the reduction in total information flow in the network that would occur if a respective state did not exist. Put differently, we focus on the degree to which the maximum flow between all unordered pairs of points depends on i and it is calculated by,
where i ≠ k ≠ j, and x i is a node in the network, i.e., the state of interest in a directed dyad; m jk is the maximum flow of information or the strength of ties from country x j to another country
is the maximum flow of information from x j to x k that passes through country x i . It is calculated taking into account all actors of the network, i.e., all unordered pairs of states in the global governance network (see Freeman et al. 1991: 148) . We use a standardized measure that ranges between 0 and 1 and follow Dorussen & Ward (2008) in operationalizing ties between states via common IGO memberships.
The raw data for our network centrality variable were retrieved from Pevehouse et al. (2004) . We then calculated the corresponding adjacency matrixes for each year in [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] and estimated the respective values on the network centrality variable for each country and year in every directed dyad. This operationalization also has practical reasons, as most IGOs are weakly institutionalized (Dorussen & Ward 2008) . Thus, in practice, we can ignore their (direct) influence as an intervening variable and an IGO then primarily serves as a vehicle that establishes ties between states through, e.g., the encounter of representatives in meetings and the working practices of the respective organization.
To estimate the interactive impact of Civil society -Dyadic counterpart and Network centrality, we multiply the two variables and simultaneously include the new variable in the models.
Control variables
Furthermore, considering alternative determinants of civil society inclusion also addresses possible selection effects, as only certain types of delegations are likely to consider the inclusion of CSOs. First, despite the lack of empirical support in previous research, we still control for the knowledge provision argument as discussed above by including an indicator for the quality of a country's public administration. We use data from the Political Risk Services Group's (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide (Howell 2011 ). Specifically, we include an indicator that is based on expert assessments and uses a 0-4 scale, with higher values signifying a higher bureaucratic quality in a country.
Second, we also include the variable GDP per capita (ln).
With a view to the environmental Kuznets curve literature (Seleden & Song 1994; Grossman & Krueger 1995) , wealthier societies are more interested in forms of environmental protection focusing on measures other than the traditional ones that reduce local pollution. Climate policy may thus be more salient than in poorer countries (Mendelsohn et al. 2006) . This, in turn, can motivate governments of richer countries to include CSOs. However, more developed countries tend to be less vulnerable to climatic changes, which may reduce the political saliency of the climate issue and the pressure for including CSOs. Because our theoretical focus lies elsewhere, we are agnostic about the net impact of such income effects, but control for them. The data are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
Third, democracies, relative to non-democracies, are more likely to provide environmental public goods at the national level and are more inclined to cooperate in international environmental problem-solving efforts as well (e.g., Congleton 1992; Ward 2008) . We use Polity IV data to measure democracy (Marshall & Jaggers 2002) , with the final variable ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).
Fourth, the literature leads us to expect that pollution levels will fall with the power of green civil society groups (see Bernauer et al. 2013 ; see also Cao & Prakash 2012: 70; Ward & Cao 2012: 6) . Hence, CSOs may have more political clout domestically if they are more numerous and this could also affect our dependent variable of interest. We control for this effect by adding the number of national environmental NGOs registered in each country using data from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (Bernauer et al. 2013 ).
Finally, state delegations vary significantly in the number of involved delegation members.
For example, the mean delegation size of the U.S. is about 71, while the Bahamas sent only two delegates to the CoPs on average. Since large countries are more likely to have larger delegations, we use the logged population size of a country to control for this. The data are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Similarly, 'big and important' countries might be more reluctant to accept constraints on their behavior that could result from CSO involvement. To account for this possibility, we include a dichotomous major power variable from the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1988 ).
Empirical results

Principle findings
We use multivariate probit analysis to estimate three models. The first model concentrates on the main explanatory variables, while it excludes the control items except those for temporal aspects. The second model includes only the control covariates. The third model considers both explanatory and control variables. Instead of reporting the probit coefficients in a standard form, we present simulated first difference estimates (King et al. 2000) . The first difference, in this context, equals the change in probability of a country including CSO
representatives that results from a change on a respective explanatory variable from the minimum to the maximum value, while holding all other covariates at their median value. Democracy, for instance, the probability of a country including CSOs increases by 19.5%.
__________________
Moreover, Major power and Domestic civil society negatively affect the probability of CSO inclusion. While the finding for the former variable is intuitively plausible, the latter might seem surprising. On average, the probability of CSO inclusion decreases by 17.5% as Domestic civil society grows from its minimum to its maximum value. One possible interpretation of this result relates to a 'democracy-civil society paradox' examined by Bernauer et al. (2013) . These scholars argue that the marginal positive effect of civil society on international environmental cooperation decreases at high levels of democracy (see also Johnson & Prakash 2007) . Finally, the insignificant effect of Bureaucratic quality is consistent with previous studies that were unable to find robust evidence for the information provision argument.
With regard to the main explanatory variables and their interactive effect, note that we cannot interpret this directly (see Brambor et al. 2006 ). Thus, we computed the marginal effect of Civil society -Dyadic counterpart on our dependent variable along the values of Network centrality to allow for a substantive interpretation. Figure 1 depicts the results. CSOs either. Put differently, even if a country is well connected in the network and, thus, is able to gain information regarding its counterparts' intentions and preferences toward CSOs, these latter actors still have to include civil society actors in the first place. If they refrain from that, though, even a well-connected country will not consider civil society actors in its delegation, since it will be less concerned then about issues of legitimacy than issues of sovereignty and autonomy. Ultimately, and under those circumstances, it is unlikely that a state will invite civil society groups to its negotiation delegation.
Survey results
The statistical results show that states more central to the global governance network are more likely to include CSOs if other states do so in the first place. We argued that the underlying causal mechanism is that governments trade additional constraints imposed by CSO inclusion off against legitimacy gains. However, while this is in line with our findings, these results could also point to other mechanisms that cannot be captured with the quantitative methodology and it still remains to be answered empirically whether state actors that formally include CSOs really perceive issues of and the tradeoff between sovereignty and legitimacy as important.
Results of a survey we conducted with 50 government representatives from national delegations to the climate CoP in Durban in December 2011 provide additional support for the hypothesized causal mechanism underlying the statistical model results. As in all surveys of this kind, the sample is not entirely random and the respondents occupy differing functions at different levels of hierarchy in national delegations. However, the survey covers a wide range of countries that differ in many ways that are relevant for our purposes: for instance, in terms of income levels (e.g., Tajikistan, Bulgaria, Denmark), the political system (e.g., China, Pakistan, the USA), country size (e.g., Kiribati, Peru, China), geographic location (our sample includes several countries from each continent), and civil society inclusion in a delegation (e.g., Brazil, Libya, Germany). 9 Moreover, 34 (68%) of the countries surveyed included CSO representatives in their respective delegation, whereas 16 (32%) did not. These shares correspond almost exactly to the observed patterns in our data set for the statistical analysis, which covers almost all countries in the UNFCCC process. Hence, we are confident that the responses obtained reflect the dominant views on CSO inclusion among the population of countries in global climate politics. Table 2 gives an overview of the survey's sample.
__________________ Table 2 Second, climate policy might be a rather exceptional case in terms of its level of CSO involvement and, thus, our study is unlikely to explain variance across domains, but rather applies to the issue of environmental and climate politics. However, although there is no systematic data that permit comparisons across global policy areas at this point, it might be an effort worth making to study other policy areas such as the security or trade domains based on our theoretical argument and empirical approach.
Third, although we could clarify why states might be more likely to include CSOs in their delegation conditional on their level of connectedness to other states and how these treat civil society, it remains unclear why the latter grant CSOs access in the first place. We found support for the contagion effect, but there must be one country in the first place that makes the decision to formally include civil society in its delegation independent from other states.
Finally, not all civil society groups are created equal and we might want to consider the relations among civil society groups and how they are networked as well. Risse-Kappen (1995) , for instance, highlights the importance of internal characteristics such as resources, strategies, and leadership skills in relation to structural factors, e.g., domestic structures and transnational institutions, in influencing the policy impact of civil society groups (see also Sell and Prakash 2004: 169) . In other words, it may be worth examining civil society organizations' characteristics, their relations, and their networks more thoroughly than it was on this, however, more data collection efforts seem necessary to address this issue more effectively (see, e.g., Bernhagen 2013: 36).
In practical policy terms, our results suggest that those interested in increasing civil society involvement in global governance should try and motivate as many states as possible to include CSO representatives in their national delegations. This would facilitate the diffusion of CSO involvement to other countries. Obtaining observer status in global governance fora, which is what most CSOs focus on, hinges on collective inter-governmental decisions to grant access to CSOs. In contrast, each country is free to decide on its own how its national delegation is composed. Civil society involvement could thus be promoted quite effectively via unilateral national steps that have ripple effects through the global governance network. 
Robustness checks
The results reported in the main article are robust to a wide range of alternative model specifications. First, Clarke (2005) Table 1 of the main text, it is worth noting that Network centrality still has a positive effect that is significant at the 1% level, but the impact of Civil society inclusion is also significant. This result supports the conclusion that the causal effect runs from network centrality to Civil society inclusion -and the other way. However, and as emphasized, our core results remain unchanged.
Fourth, an anonymous reviewer raised the concern that the binary operationalization of our dependent variable might be inappropriate and suggested instead a count item capturing the number of civil society actors as part of state delegations. The original rationale behind the binary operationalization was twofold. First, the binary variable taken from does not suffer from missing values. However, the count item lacks information for some state delegations. Second, a dichotomous operationalization employs a somewhat conservative approach, which ensures that we do not overestimate the impact on the inclusion of civil society organizations in a delegation. That being said, we re-estimated all models with a count item instead, using a negative binomial regression model that follows the specifications of Model 3 in Table 1 where y t constitutes our dependent variable, X pertains to the set of control variables and the constant, and Wy t-1 signifies the product of the row-standardized connectivity matrix (W) and the dependent variable lagged by one year (y t-1 ), i.e., Wy t-1 is the spatial lag. In the words of : 1084 , 'the connectivity matrix, W, is NTxNT matrix with TNxN submatrices along the block diagonal, and typical element w i,j,t capturing relative connectivity or influence from unit j to i at time t.' The spatial lag 'gives a weighted average of other observations in the year concerned, with each weight specified by w i,j,t . The estimation of ρ (spatial coefficient) captures the strength of policy interdependence'. We row standardized the connectivity matrix so that the estimated values of ρ reflect the average influence of other countries' behavior toward civil society organizations (excluding a respective country under study).
However, in order to avoid simultaneity bias, we employed a lagged version of the dependent variable in order to calculate the spatial lag (Franzese & Hays 2007) , i.e., the spatial lag does not give a weighted average of other observations in the year concerned, but in the previous year. Following our theoretical rationale, higher levels of policy interdependence and mutual influence regarding the inclusion of civil society organizations in delegations should be given for states that are more strongly connected to each other. We measured the degree of connectedness between two states via their co-affiliation to intergovernmental organizations, i.e., each element w i,j,t in the connectivity matrix is the number of common memberships in intergovernmental organizations shared by country i and country j. The data for this are taken from the same source we used for Network centrality in the main article, while we transformed our data set into a monadic version that has the country-year as the unit of analysis. We expected a positive spatial coefficient ρ and, in fact, the unreported estimation of a probit regression model that substitutes Civil society -Dyadic counterpart, Network centrality, and their interaction term for the spatial lag supports this.
More specifically, when moving from the minimum to the maximum of Wy t-1 , the probability of a country including civil society organizations increases by about 42%. Hence, this
